Hej,
Kort sagt: ja – det har det.
Jeg har lavet en kort opsummering af begivenhederne via (ChatGPT); jeg håber det hjælper her:
I slutningen af 2025 ramte Curaçaos længe lovede spillereform (LOK – Landsverordening op de Kansspelen) et stort bump.
Hele bestyrelsen for Curaçao Gaming Authority (CGA) trådte tilbage i midten af september, hvilket efterlod tilsynsmyndigheden uden sit øverste tilsynsorgan i det øjeblik, den skulle overgå til en mere gennemsigtig og struktureret reguleringsmodel.
LOK blev introduceret for at erstatte det gamle masterlicenssystem, men...
Hele bestyrelsens afgang skabte et tydeligt ledelsesvakuum.
CGA fortsatte driften – udstedte licenser, håndterede overholdelse af regler og kommunikerede med offentligheden – men uden det udvalg, der skulle føre tilsyn med og validere dets beslutninger.
Samtidig:
Ansvaret for tilsyn med spil blev flyttet fra Finansministeriet til Justitsministeriet,
Kommunikationen fra regeringen var inkonsekvent, og reformfristerne blev ved med at glide.
Resultatet?
En regulator, der er teknisk set funktionel, men synligt ustabil.
Hvor kommer AOFA ind i billedet?
Mens CGA forsøgte at navigere i den interne turbulens, udnyttede AOFA (Autonomous Online Gaming Association) situationen.
Operatører og aktører tiltrukket sig naturligt alle, der virkede mere stabile, mere kommunikative og i det mindste nogenlunde forudsigelige – selvom den faktiske kvalitet af tilsynet ikke var væsentligt anderledes.
AOFA fik hurtigt relevans fordi:
CGA så usikker ud efter opsigelserne i september,
Implementeringen af LOK var langsommere end forventet.
og interessenterne var desperate efter at skabe orden.
Konklusionen:
LOK er stadig en nødvendig reform, men udførelsen har været rodet.
CGA forbliver operationel, men tabet af bestyrelsen underminerede tilliden.
AOFA voksede hurtigt, primært fordi det udfyldte hullet i opfattelsen, ikke fordi det i sagens natur er bedre.
Lige nu er Curaçaos landskab en blanding af "igangværende arbejde", skiftende ansvarsområder og organisationer, der forsøger at bevise, at de kan tilbyde struktur, hvor det officielle system stadig vakler.
Fra spillerens perspektiv:
1. Curaçao har ikke et rigtigt ADR-system
Der er ingen officiel, struktureret eller håndhævbar mekanisme til at løse tvister mellem spillere og operatører.
Ingen obligatoriske deadlines, ingen gennemsigtige procedurer, ingen offentliggjorte afgørelser.
Det findes simpelthen ikke.
2. "Kontakt tilsynsmyndigheden" lyder godt, men i praksis…
Det meste af tiden betyder det:
"Vi har modtaget din besked. Derudover er der ikke meget, vi kan gøre."
CGA kan:
anerkender klagen,
videresende dig tilbage til operatøren, eller
slet ikke svare.
Det er ikke ondskab – de mangler simpelthen mandat, kapacitet og værktøjer til at håndtere individuelle tvister, især med underlicenserede operatører.
3. Hele systemet blev bygget til at overlade tvister til casinoet
Historisk set var Curaçao-rammeværket designet således, at forholdet mellem spilleren og casinoet forblev strengt privat.
Regulatoren holdt sig væk fra handlingen,
og der var ikke behov for alternativ tvistbilæggelse.
4. Hele bestyrelsens afgang gjorde den endnu svagere
Systemet var allerede skrøbeligt.
Efter fratrædelserne i september er der endnu mindre tilsyn og endnu mindre beføjelse til at gribe ind i klagesager.
5. Den hårde sandhed
Curaçao er ikke en effektiv metode til at løse tvister eller inddrive udbetalinger. Hverken nu eller historisk set.
En artikel fra SiGMA: https://sigma.world/news/curacao-pm-control-gaming-body-board-en-masse/
Hello,
Simply put: yes—it has.
I did a brief recap with (ChatGPT) of the events; I hope it helps here:
In late 2025, Curaçao’s long-promised gambling reform (LOK – Landsverordening op de Kansspelen) hit a major bump.
The entire Supervisory Board of the Curaçao Gaming Authority (CGA) resigned in mid-September, leaving the regulator without its top oversight body at the very moment it was supposed to transition to a more transparent and structured regulatory model.
LOK was introduced to replace the old master-licence system, however...
The resignation of the entire Supervisory Board created an obvious governance vacuum.
CGA continued operating — issuing licences, handling compliance, communicating with the public — but without the board that was supposed to oversee and validate its decisions.
At the same time:
responsibility for gambling oversight was shifted from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Justice,
communication from the government was inconsistent, and reform deadlines kept slipping.
The result?
A regulator technically functional, but visibly unstable.
Where AOFA comes in?
While CGA was trying to navigate internal turbulence, AOFA (the Autonomous Online Gaming Association) capitalised on the situation.
Operators and players naturally gravitated towards anyone who seemed more stable, more communicative, and at least somewhat predictable — even if the actual quality of oversight was not significantly different.
AOFA quickly gained relevance because:
CGA looked shaky after the September resignations,
LOK implementation was slower than expected,
and stakeholders were desperate for a sense of order.
The bottom line:
LOK is still a necessary reform, but the execution has been messy.
CGA remains operational, but the loss of its supervisory board undermined confidence.
AOFA grew fast, mostly because it filled the perception gap, not because it is inherently better.
Right now, Curaçao’s landscape is a mix of "work in progress," shifting responsibilities, and organisations trying to prove they can offer structure where the official system still wobbles.
From the player's perspective:
1. Curaçao does not operate a real ADR system
There is no official, structured, or enforceable mechanism for resolving disputes between players and operators.
No mandatory deadlines, no transparent procedures, no published decisions.
It simply doesn’t exist.
2. "Contact the regulator" sounds good, but in practice…
Most of the time, it means:
"We received your message. Beyond that, there isn’t much we can do."
CGA may:
acknowledge the complaint,
forward you back to the operator, or
not respond at all.
It’s not malice — they simply lack the mandate, capacity, and tools to deal with individual disputes, especially with sub-licensed operators.
3. The whole system was built to leave disputes to the casino
Historically, the Curaçao framework was designed so that the relationship between the player and the casino remained strictly private.
The regulator stayed hands-off,
and no alternative dispute resolution was required.
4. The resignation of the entire Supervisory Board made it even weaker
The system was already fragile.
After the September resignations, there is even less oversight and even less authority to intervene in complaint cases.
5. The hard truth
Curaçao is not an effective route for resolving disputes or enforcing payouts. Not now, not historically.
An article from SiGMA: https://sigma.world/news/curacao-pm-control-gaming-body-board-en-masse/
Automatisk oversættelse: